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[美] 拉奉特(Laffont J.J.) 著
出版社: 世界图书出版公司 ISBN:9787510050503 版次:1 商品编码:11154485 包装:平装 外文名称:The Theory of Incentives:The Principal-Agent Model 开本:16开 出版时间:2013-01-01 用纸:胶版纸 页数:421 正文语种:英文
Introduction
1 Incentives in Economic'Thought
1.1 Adam Smith and Incentive Contracts in Agriculture
1.2 Chester Barnard and Incentives in Management
1.3 Hume, Wicksell, Croves: The Free-Rider Problem
1.4 Borda, Bowen, Vickrey: Incentives in Voting
1.5 L60n Walras and the Regulation of Natural Monopolies
1.6 Knight, Arrow, Pauly: Incentives in Insurance
1.7 Sidgwick, Vickrey, Mirrlees: Redistribution and Incentives
1.8 Dupuit, Edgeworth, Pigou: Price Discrimination
1.9 Incentives in Plaiined Economies
1.10 Leonid Hurwicz and Mechanism Design
1.11 Auctions
2 The Rent Extraction-Efficiency Trade-Off
2.1 The Basic Model
2.2 The Complete Information Optimal Contract
2.3 Incentive Feasible Menu of Contracts
2.4 Information Rents
2.5 The Optunization Program of the PrincipaJ
2.6 The Rent Extraction-Efficiency Trade-Off
2.7 The Theory of the Firm Under Asymmetric Information
2.8 Asymmetric Information and Marginal Cost Pricing
2.9 The Revelation Principle
2.10 A More General Utility Function for the Agent
2.11 Ex Ante versus Ex Post Participation Constraints
2.12 Commitment
2.13 Stochastic Mechanisms
2.14 Informative Signals to Improve Contracting
2.15 Contract Theory at Work
Appendix
3 Incentive and Participation Constraints with Adverse Selection
3.1 More than Two Types
3.2 Multidimensional Asymmetric Information
3.3 Type-Dependent Participation Constraint and
Countervailing Incentives
3.4 Random Participation Constraint
3.5 Limited Liability
3.6 Audit Mechanisms and Costly State Verification
3.7 Redistributive Concerns and the Efficiency-Equity Trade-off
Appendices
4 Moral Hazard: The Basic Trade-Offs
4.1 The Model
4.2 Risk Neutrality and First-Best Implementation
……
5 Incentive and Participation Constraints with Moral Hazard
6 Nonverifiability
7 Mixed Models
8 Dynamics under Full Commitment
9 Limits and Extensions
Re ferences
Author Index
Subject Index
The book allows for two levels of reading. Certain sections in some chapters are marked with a star to the right of the section head. A first reading should concentrate on the non-starred sections. These sections are accessible to readers who have a simple knowledge of maximization with inequality constraints. Most essential economic lessons can be understood from this first level of reading. Cov-ering the starred sections will enable smdents to manipulate the concepts for better assimilation and will put them in contact with the advanced topics of the field.
Going through the text and.checking the proofs should provide a good way for stu-dents to appropriate the material. Throughout the book we have listed under the heading the major references that are useful to pursue the study of incentive theory.
……
数学与金融经典教材(影印版)·激励理论:委托代理模型 [The Theory of Incentives:The Principal-Agent Model] 电子书 下载 mobi epub pdf txt
数学与金融经典教材(影印版)·激励理论:委托代理模型 [The Theory of Incentives:The Principal-Agent Model]-so88
数学与金融经典教材(影印版)·激励理论:委托代理模型 [The Theory of Incentives:The Principal-Agent Model] pdf epub mobi txt 电子书 下载 2022
图书介绍
☆☆☆☆☆
||
[美] 拉奉特(Laffont J.J.) 著
出版社: 世界图书出版公司 ISBN:9787510050503 版次:1 商品编码:11154485 包装:平装 外文名称:The Theory of Incentives:The Principal-Agent Model 开本:16开 出版时间:2013-01-01 用纸:胶版纸 页数:421 正文语种:英文
内容简介
The book allows for two levels of reading. Certain sections in some chapters are marked with a star to the right of the section head. A first reading should concentrate on the non-starred sections. These sections are accessible to readers who have a simple knowledge of maximization with inequality constraints. Most essential economic lessons can be understood from this first level of reading. Cov-ering the starred sections will enable smdents to manipulate the concepts for better assimilation and will put them in contact with the advanced topics of the field.内页插图
目录
ForewordIntroduction
1 Incentives in Economic'Thought
1.1 Adam Smith and Incentive Contracts in Agriculture
1.2 Chester Barnard and Incentives in Management
1.3 Hume, Wicksell, Croves: The Free-Rider Problem
1.4 Borda, Bowen, Vickrey: Incentives in Voting
1.5 L60n Walras and the Regulation of Natural Monopolies
1.6 Knight, Arrow, Pauly: Incentives in Insurance
1.7 Sidgwick, Vickrey, Mirrlees: Redistribution and Incentives
1.8 Dupuit, Edgeworth, Pigou: Price Discrimination
1.9 Incentives in Plaiined Economies
1.10 Leonid Hurwicz and Mechanism Design
1.11 Auctions
2 The Rent Extraction-Efficiency Trade-Off
2.1 The Basic Model
2.2 The Complete Information Optimal Contract
2.3 Incentive Feasible Menu of Contracts
2.4 Information Rents
2.5 The Optunization Program of the PrincipaJ
2.6 The Rent Extraction-Efficiency Trade-Off
2.7 The Theory of the Firm Under Asymmetric Information
2.8 Asymmetric Information and Marginal Cost Pricing
2.9 The Revelation Principle
2.10 A More General Utility Function for the Agent
2.11 Ex Ante versus Ex Post Participation Constraints
2.12 Commitment
2.13 Stochastic Mechanisms
2.14 Informative Signals to Improve Contracting
2.15 Contract Theory at Work
Appendix
3 Incentive and Participation Constraints with Adverse Selection
3.1 More than Two Types
3.2 Multidimensional Asymmetric Information
3.3 Type-Dependent Participation Constraint and
Countervailing Incentives
3.4 Random Participation Constraint
3.5 Limited Liability
3.6 Audit Mechanisms and Costly State Verification
3.7 Redistributive Concerns and the Efficiency-Equity Trade-off
Appendices
4 Moral Hazard: The Basic Trade-Offs
4.1 The Model
4.2 Risk Neutrality and First-Best Implementation
……
5 Incentive and Participation Constraints with Moral Hazard
6 Nonverifiability
7 Mixed Models
8 Dynamics under Full Commitment
9 Limits and Extensions
Re ferences
Author Index
Subject Index
前言/序言
The development of the theory of incentives has been a major advance iii eco- nomics in the last thirty years. The objective of this book is to provide easy access to this theory for undergraduate and first-year graduate smdents in economics. Our goal is not to be as complete as possible in covering and surveying the many contributions that have fiourished in the realm of incentive theory. Instead, our contribution is methodological and intended to offer students some iiiitial clues for analyzing the issues raised by this theory. As much as possible we have favored the simplest models to explain the core of the theory. The exposition has been divided into three books for methodological clarity. This volume presents the basic principal-agent theory with complete contracts. It allows a first exposition of the transaction costs created by contracting under asymmetric information without having to appeal to sophisticated game theory concepts.The book allows for two levels of reading. Certain sections in some chapters are marked with a star to the right of the section head. A first reading should concentrate on the non-starred sections. These sections are accessible to readers who have a simple knowledge of maximization with inequality constraints. Most essential economic lessons can be understood from this first level of reading. Cov-ering the starred sections will enable smdents to manipulate the concepts for better assimilation and will put them in contact with the advanced topics of the field.
Going through the text and.checking the proofs should provide a good way for stu-dents to appropriate the material. Throughout the book we have listed under the heading the major references that are useful to pursue the study of incentive theory.
……
数学与金融经典教材(影印版)·激励理论:委托代理模型 [The Theory of Incentives:The Principal-Agent Model] 电子书 下载 mobi epub pdf txt
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